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Does Paying Politicians More Promote Economic Diversity in
Legislatures?
NICHOLAS CARNES Duke University
ERIC R. HANSEN University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
If politicians in the United States were paid better, would more middle- and working-class peoplebecome politicians? Reformers often argue that the low salaries paid in state and local governmentsmake holding office economically infeasible for lower-income citizens and contribute to the enduring
numerical under-representation of the working class in our political institutions. Of course, raising
politicians’ salaries could also make political office more attractive to affluent professionals, increasing
competition for office and ultimately discouraging lower-income citizens from running and winning.
In this article, we test these hypotheses using data on the salaries and economic backgrounds of state
legislators. Contrary to the notion that paying politicians more promotes economic diversity, we find that
the descriptive representation of the working class is the same or worse in states that pay legislators higher
salaries. These findings have important implications for research on descriptive representation, political
compensation, and political inequality.
Political observers often argue that the lowsalaries paid in state and local governmentsmake holding office economically infeasible for
lower-income citizens. Journalistsworry that “working-
class people . . . do not have the means or the time to
run for office and serve” (Fausset 2014, 1). Activists
argue that “[a]s long as state legislatures are part-time
and poorly funded, it is an uphill battle for an ordinary
person to serve and pay the bills at the same time”
(Confidential 2014, 1). And reformers assert that “[i]t
is past time for an honest debate about [raising] legisla-
tive pay . . . to make it possible for a broad cross section
of people to serve” (Fitzsimon 2010, 1). Running a
campaign and holding a political office take time and
money. If politicians were paid better, the argument
goes, more middle- and working-class people could af-
ford to be politicians (see also Blumberg 2014).
Would raising politicians’ salaries actually encourage
more people of modest means to seek and hold polit-
ical office? Although observers routinely argue that
it would, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence
on this point. Scholarly research on politicians’ salaries
has recently focused more on outcomes like legislative
productivity (e.g., Ferraz and Finan 2009); to date, no
published study has examined how the salaries paid
to politicians in the United States affect whether more
and less affluentAmericans seek and hold public office.
Likewise, the emerging literature on the numerical or
descriptive representation of social classes has started
to investigate why so few middle- and working-class
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peopleholdpolitical office in theUnitedStates, but that
work has focused primarily on voters, parties, and in-
terest groups (e.g., Carnes 2013; Sadin 2012; Sojourner
2013), not on institutional rules like legislative salaries.
There are certainly reasons to suspect that offer-
ing politicians in the United States higher salaries
would encourage more lower-income and working-
class Americans to hold political office, but there are
also good reasons to be skeptical. Raising politicians’
salaries could make holding office more feasible for
the less fortunate, but it could also make political of-
fice more attractive to affluent professionals, increas-
ing competition for office and ultimately discourag-
ing lower-income citizens from running and winning.
In other advanced democracies, political institutions
that pay more tend to attract more white-collar profes-
sionals (e.g., Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013). Giving
politicians in the United States a pay raise might make
holding office more affordable for the working class,
but it might also make public office more attractive to
white-collar Americans.
In this article, we use data on state legislatures in
the United States to measure the relationship between
politicians’ salaries and the social classmakeupof polit-
ical institutions. Drawing on aggregate-level data from
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
and data from the 2012 National Candidate Study—
a one-of-a-kind individual-level survey of the 10,000
state legislative candidates who ran for office that
year—we explore the links between legislative salaries
and the occupational makeup of state-level candidates
and politicians. Our findings have important implica-
tions for scholars and activists interested in politicians’
salaries, the social class makeup of government, and
reforms to address political inequality.
POLITICIANS’ SALARIES AND ECONOMIC
DIVERSITY
Pay raises for politicians are usually controversial.
How much we pay our leaders naturally evokes ques-
tions about the spirit of public service, the quality of
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government, the meaning of fair compensation, and a
host of other weighty normative issues. It also evokes
more straightforward empirical questions. Would pay-
ing politicians more give us leaders who are less cor-
rupt? More responsive to their constituents? More
likely to run again? More diverse?
The answers are often “yes.” A growing body of em-
pirical research suggests that politicians’ salaries are
associated with a wide range of important outcomes.
When politicians in the United States are paid more,
they are less likely to pursue outside employment while
serving in office (Maddox 2004), they introduce more
legislation and miss fewer votes (Hoffman and Lyons
2015), they aremore in-stepwith their constituents ide-
ologically (Besley 2004), they aremore likely to run for
re-election (Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo 2005), they
favor citizen interests over business interests (Bowen
and Mo 2016), and they face more competition from
qualified challengers (Hoffman andLyons 2015). There
is also some evidence that more Democrats are elected
when politicians are paid more (Fiorina 1994) and that
party leaders are more involved in candidate recruit-
ment (Sanbonmatsu 2006). How much we pay our po-
litical leaders seems to affect the kind of government
we get in return.
Does it also affect the economic or social class
backgrounds of our political decision makers, as re-
formers often claim? The idea seems worth explor-
ing. Politicians in the United States tend to be vastly
better off than the people they represent; they are
wealthier, more educated, and more likely to come
from white-collar jobs (Beckett and Sunderland 1957;
Domhoff 1967; Hyneman 1940; Key 1956; Matthews
1954a; 1954b;Mills 1956; Orth 1904; Sadin 2012; Squire
1992; Zeller 1954). If millionaires were a political party,
that party would make up just three percent of the
country, but it would have a majority in the House
of Representatives, a filibuster-proof supermajority in
the Senate, a 5-4 majority on the Supreme Court, and a
man in theWhiteHouse. If working-classAmericans—
people employed in manual-labor and service-industry
jobs—were a political party, that party would have
made upmore than half of the country since the start of
the 20th century, but legislators from that party (those
who last worked in blue-collar jobs before getting into
politics) would never have held more than two percent
of the seats in Congress.
These economic and social class gaps appear to have
important consequences for public policy. One emerg-
ing line of research has found that lawmakers from
different classes tend to bring different perspectives
to the political process. Just as the shortage of women
in office affects policy outcomes on issues related to
gender (e.g., Berkman andO’Connor 1993; Swers 2002;
Thomas 1991), the shortage of working-class people—
who tend to be more progressive on economic issues—
appears to bias policy on issues like the minimum
wage, taxes, and welfare spending towards the more
conservative positions typically favored by affluent
Americans (e.g., Carnes 2013; Grose 2013; Griffin and
Anewalt-Remsburg 2013). Building on these findings,
another nascent literature has begun to ask why there
are so few working-class Americans in political office
in the first place (Sadin 2012; Sojourner 2013; see also
Campbell and Cowley 2014). If paying politiciansmore
does in fact promote economic diversity in our political
institutions, it would have important implications for
research on descriptive representation—and forAmer-
ican democracy more generally.
As it stands, we simply don’t know. Research on
the factors that discourage lower-income and working-
class Americans from holding political office is still
relatively new, and most of the work that has been
done to date has focused not on institutional factors
like legislator salaries, but on factors like the qualifica-
tions of the working class (Carnes 2013), the views of
voters (Sadin 2012), and the strength of labor unions
(Carnes 2016; Sojourner 2013). A handful of political
compensation studies have examined the links between
legislative salaries and the number of college graduates
or attorneys in office (Besley 2004; Diermeier, Keane,
and Merlo 2005; Hoffman and Lyons 2015; Kotako-
rpi and Poutvaara 2011),1 but no compensation study
to date has asked about the political representation
of the working class. Although reformers often argue
that pay raises for politicians would encourage lower-
income and working-class Americans to run for and
hold public office, to the best of our knowledge, no
previous study ever has directly tested this claim.
There are certainly signs that the argument has
promise. What little research there is on the descrip-
tive representation of lower-income or working-class
people suggests the shortage of workers in office is
not the result of either a deficit of qualifications on
the part of workers or some sort of antiworker bias
on the part of voters (e.g., Sadin 2012). Institutional
rules like salaries could be a part of the explanation;
scholars have long known that the structure of political
institutions can affect the descriptive representation of
other social groups like women or racial and ethnic
minorities (e.g., Canon 1999; Trounstine and Valdini
2008; see also Rosenson 2006).
Then again, there are also signs that paying politi-
ciansmoremight not increase the representation of the
less fortunate. Across different levels of government,
larger jurisdictions like states or counties—which usu-
ally pay politicians higher salaries—tend to have fewer
working-class politicians (Carnes 2013). And in gen-
eral, legislative professionalization appears to make
it difficult for underrepresented groups to break into
office (e.g., Casellas 2011; Squire 1992). If we wish to
1 These studies have reached mixed results. Using six decades of
data on state legislators and governors, Hoffman and Lyons (2015)
find that politicians’ salaries are not associated with their educa-
tion levels or whether they were attorneys. Using data on 18 states,
Besley (2004) finds that better-paid governors are more likely to be
attorneys and have more years of political experience. Using data on
members ofCongresswho servedbetween 1947 and 1994,Diermeier,
Keane, and Merlo (2005) find that members with advanced degrees
were more likely to leave Congress to pursue higher-paying jobs
in the private sector. And using data from Finland, Kotakorpi and
Poutvaara (2011) find that a 35 percent increase in pay for Members
of Parliament in 2000 was associated with a modest increase in the
education levels of female parliamentary candidates, but not male
candidates.
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understand the links between politician compensation
and the social class makeup of government, we will
need to look more carefully at that relationship.
How Salaries Could Matter
We will also need to think more carefully about it.
When reformers discuss political compensation, they
seldom spell out exactly how they believe it will af-
fect the descriptive representation of different social
classes.
One important distinction that is often obscured
in popular discussions is the difference between how
salaries affectwho runs,who wins, andwho runs again.
The numerical or descriptive representation of any so-
cial group is determined by the number of people from
that group who run for office, the number of those
who win election, and the number who subsequently
choose to run again, either for the same office or for
another level or branch of government (e.g., Lawless
and Fox 2005; 2010). When reformers talk about the
links between legislative salaries and the descriptive
representation of the working class, however, they sel-
dom specify exactly which part of the larger office-
holder “pipeline” is affected by the salaries offered to
politicians.
Moreover, reform proposals often focus on how
pay raises for politicians might affect lower-income or
working-classAmericans without also considering how
increasing legislative salaries would affect the incen-
tives ofmore affluent citizens. Even if raising legislative
salaries makes holding officemore attractive to the less
fortunate, if it also makes holding office more attrac-
tive to affluent professionals, higher pay could actually
stimulate more heated competition for elected office
and ultimately make it harder for working-class Amer-
icans to break into politics. The relationship between
politicians’ salaries and working-class representation
simply may not be as straightforward as reformers of-
ten suggest.
To the contrary, it is easy to imagine a variety of
mechanisms bywhich legislative salaries could increase
or decrease the numerical representation of the work-
ing class among candidates, officeholders, and office-
holders who run again.
The most common argument among reformers is
that higher pay would increase the number of working-
class people who run, or perhaps the number who run
for re-election. One version of this argument holds that
when pay is low, people with low incomes, less flexi-
ble work schedules, and less savings or wealth simply
can’t afford to pay their bills while holding office—the
utility associated with being a politician is unbearably
negative, so they choose not to run in the first place.
(This idea is consistent with some economic threshold
models of candidate entry, e.g.,Maddox2004.)Another
version (which reformers mention less often but which
is consistent with some theoretical work on candidate
entry, e.g., Mattozzi and Merlo 2008) holds that rais-
ing politicians’ salaries would initially make holding
office more appealing to people making low incomes
(who could increase their earnings by several orders of
magnitude by serving in office) than to people making
high incomes. In either case, the potentialmechanism is
essentially the same: raising politicians’ salaries could
increase the benefits workers associate with holding
office (more than it increases the utility boost profes-
sionals receive), and thereby increase the number of
lower-income Americans who run for office or for re-
election.
Then again, there are also reasons to think that
paying more might reduce the percentage of work-
ers who choose to run or run again. For one, paying
politicians more could make holding office more at-
tractive to white-collar professionals by reducing the
opportunity cost associated with holding office; recent
theoretical models of candidate quality have argued
that paying politicians more will simply give affluent
professionals more material incentives to forego high-
paying jobs in the private sector (e.g., Besley 2004;
Besley and Coate 1997; see also Osborne and Slivinski
1996). Raising salaries could also increase the status
or prestige associated with holding office, which could
in turn increase the number of professionals who run
(by making public office more attractive to people who
already work in prestigious jobs) and/or decrease the
number of workers who run (by making people who
work in less prestigious jobs feel less well-suited for a
job in politics). Paying politicians more could also alter
the behavior of the party and interest group leaders
who often recruit candidates; when politicians are paid
better, these gatekeepers may be more likely to look
to highly paid occupations for potential recruits (e.g.,
Sanbonmatsu 2006), which could increase the number
of professionalswho runand/or decrease thenumberof
workers who run. And if more professionals ultimately
run when pay is higher, the heightened competition
could itself discourage working-class candidates from
running. In theory, there are a host of mechanisms
by which pay raises for politicians could ultimately
shrink the share of workers who run for office or for
re-election.
There are also reasons to think that paying more
could reduce the percentage of workers who win (over
and above any effect it has on workers’ representa-
tion in the candidate pool). If public office pays more,
voters might expect politicians to more closely resem-
ble people who earn high pay in other areas of life.
Although there is no prior research on this topic, it
is at least conceivable that raising politicians’ salaries
more could actually reduce the odds that voters will
elect the working-class candidates who run. (And we
know of no reason to think the opposite, that is, that
higher pay might make voters more likely to elect
workers.)
It is also possible that the relationshipbetweenpoliti-
cian compensation and the share of workers who run or
win could be curvilinear. Perhaps increasing legislative
salaries from $0 at firstmakes holding office feasible for
lower-income and working-class people (thereby in-
creasing the share of workers who run), but increasing
salaries further eventually makes holding office attrac-
tive to white-collar professionals (thereby increasing
701
Does Paying Politicians More Promote Economic Diversity in Legislatures? November 2016
the share of professionals who run and reducing the
share of workers).
And, of course, there are also reasons why we might
expect salaries not to have any effect on the social class
makeup of who runs, who wins, or who runs again.
Obviously, there are many factors besides the rate of
pay for politicians that could discourage working class
Americans from holding office. Workers might have
a harder time raising campaign donations, have less
interest in politics, or lack necessary skills like public
speaking. Or perhaps the salary paid to politicians isn’t
the problem, but rather the salary (or lack thereof)
paid to candidates: for many lower-income Americans,
taking time off work to run a campaign may simply
be impossible regardless of the salary they would earn
if elected. The numerical representation of the work-
ing class might have nothing to do with the salaries
we offer politicians; there are many other factors that
could be discouraging workers from running, winning,
or running for re-election.
So which is it? Are reformers right that the shortage
of working-class politicians is partly the result of the
low salaries offered in most political offices? Or would
paying more drive the share of workers in our political
institutions even lower? Or simply have no effect on
the economic diversity of our government?
EVIDENCE FROM STATE LEGISLATURES
One way to begin improving our answers to these im-
portant questions is to study state legislatures. States
are ideal for several reasons. State politicians are more
numerous than federal officials—for every member of
Congress, there are roughly 13 state legislators. And
states tend to varymore than federal institutions. Com-
pared to members of Congress, state legislators are far
more diverse in terms of the salaries they earn, the
contexts in which they campaign and govern, and the
social classes they come from.
Moreover, states governments make important de-
cisions. States write and administer economic policies
ranging from minimum wage and income tax rates to
cash assistance levels for needy families. In 2008, state
government expenditures totaled more than $1.2 tril-
lion (more than 8 percent of GDP).2 And at the state
level, the social class makeup of government seems to
affect policy as much as it does at the federal level
(Carnes 2013, chap. 5).
As a test of the idea that paying politicians more
increases the numerical representation of the working
class, we analyzed data on the salaries offered to state
legislators and the number of candidates and office-
holders in each state legislature who worked primarily
in working-class jobs, that is, manual labor jobs (like
factoryworker), service-industry positions (like restau-
2 Available online from http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/ (ac-
cessed August 16, 2010). This estimate reflects direct expenditures
excluding intergovernmental transfers to local governments.
rant server), clerical jobs (like receptionist), or union
jobs (like field organizer).3
Collecting data on state legislative salaries was rela-
tively straightforward. Scholars interested in legislative
professionalism have amassed a great deal of accurate,
over-time data on the average salaries paid to legisla-
tors in all 50 states (e.g., Squire 1992; 2007). Legisla-
tive compensation varies dramatically. At the low end,
New Hampshire pays most of its legislators $200 per
two-year term, while New Mexico pays no salary at all
(though New Mexican legislators do receive a roughly
$150 per diem while meeting in Santa Fe). At the high
end, legislators in California, Michigan, and New York
all earn over $75,000 annually.
Collecting data on the economic or social class back-
grounds of politicians is more challenging. Surveys of
candidates and officeholders at the state level are rare,
and many of those that have been conducted have not
asked about legislators’ occupational backgrounds. Al-
though many states list legislators’ occupations on the
web, the practice is relatively new—below the national
level, systematic biographical information about office-
holders is often hard to come by. Biographical data
on candidates is even harder to get. Many candidates
for state office run small campaigns, have limited web
presences, are never covered extensively by the media,
and quickly remove campaign materials from the web
after election time.
For this analysis, we relied on two sources of data
on state legislators’ and candidates’ occupations: an
aggregate-level dataset on state legislators (that is,
those who won elections and went on to hold of-
fice) and an individual-level dataset on candidates for
state legislature (successful or not). The aggregate-
level dataset consisted of information about the oc-
cupational makeup of legislators in all 50 states. In
1979, the Insurance Information Institute of America
compiled data on the main occupations held by every
state legislator nationwide and published the results in
state-level aggregates. In 1993, 1995, and 2007, the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures followed suit.
We used a dataset that combined all four waves of data
(see also Carnes 2013, chap. 5) to determine whether
working-class people are, in fact, more likely to serve
3 Of course, there are other ways to disaggregate occupations (e.g.,
some people might not classify clerical jobs as “blue collar”), and
otherways tomeasure class (e.g., income,wealth, family background,
subjective perceptions, etc.). Most modern class analysts agree, how-
ever, that anymeasure of class should be rooted in occupational data,
that is, information about how a person earns a living (e.g., Hout,
Manza, and Brooks 1995; Weeden and Grusky 2005; Wright 1997).
And the distinction betweenworking-class jobs andwhite-collar jobs
seems to be the major class-based dividing line in political opinion
in the United States. Research on legislators (Carnes 2013) squares
with both intuitions; lawmakers fromworking-class jobs tend to vote
significantly differently than legislators from white-collar jobs, but
legislators with higher net worths, more formal education, or well-
to-do parents tend not to behave as differently. There are important
differences within theworking-class andwhite-collar categories (e.g.,
between manual laborers and clerical workers), of course, but the
major dividing line is between workers, who tend to support more
progressive economic policies, and professionals, who tend to sup-
port a more conservative role for government in economic affairs.
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in the state legislature in times and places where doing
so pays more.
To determine whether working-class people are
more likely to run, win, and run again when hold-
ing office pays more, we also analyzed a unique na-
tional survey of state legislative candidates, the 2012
National Candidate Study (or NCS). In August 2012,
Broockman et al. (2012) surveyed the 10,131 people
running for state legislature nationwide at that time.
The study achieved a 19 percent response rate—1,907
state legislative candidates submitted responses—and
the survey appeared to capture the views of a repre-
sentative sample of candidates (response rates were
well-balanced on several important observable char-
acteristics, like the party of the candidate, whether
the candidate went on to win or lose the election,
the candidate’s vote margin, and the candidate’s re-
gion; see Broockman and Skovron 2013). Moreover,
the response rate did not seem to be higher among
the affluent (a common concern in survey research):
the survey’s respondents included 52 workers (3% of
respondents), a sample about as large as we would
expect based on other exhaustive studies of the social
class backgrounds of state legislators (see appendix
Table A1 for additional supporting information) and
large enough to make at least simple inferences about
candidates from the working class.4 With this dataset,
we can see not just whether working-class people are
more likely to win office in places that pay politicians
more, but whether workers are more likely to run for
offices that pay better or run again after being elected.
The National Candidate Study also included ques-
tions that tapped some of the potential mediating fac-
tors that could be driving any relationships we observe
between salaries and the share of workers who run
or win, like how concerned each candidate was about
losing income while holding office. Together, these
datasets allowed us to test the link between legisla-
tive salaries and the overall descriptive representation
of the working class (e.g., whether workers held of-
fice), the behaviors of workers (whether they made
up greater shares of candidates who ran, won, or ran
again), and some of the attitudes that might mediate
those relationships (e.g., whether workers worried less
about lost income in states that paid more).
POLITICAL COMPENSATION AND
ECONOMIC DIVERSITY
Figure 1 uses the aggregate-level data from 1979, 1993,
1995, and 2007 to plot the basic relationship between
how well a state pays its legislators (adjusted to 2007
dollar values) and the percentage of lawmakers in that
state from working-class jobs. The pattern in the data
4 Of course, 52 is not a huge number, and obviously an ideal study
would havemore working-class candidates. However, we know of no
better data on the occupational backgrounds of a national sample of
state legislative candidates; if we wish to leave no stone unturned in
this analysis, we cannot ignore the Broockman et al. survey. (More-
over, as we show below, our findings using this survey parallel what
we find using aggregate-level data from the National Conference of
State Legislatures, which increases our confidence in both datasets.)
FIGURE 1. Legislative Salaries and
Working-class Representation in State
Legislatures (1979, 1993, 1995, and 2007)
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Con-
ference of State Legislatures (1993, 1995, 2007), and authors’
data collection.
is unmistakable; in states that pay legislators higher
salaries, working-class citizens make up smaller shares
of the state legislature, not larger ones.
In sharp contrast to the idea that pay raises make
public office more accessible to the working class, the
political representation of workers is worst in states
that pay legislators salaries over $75,000—about 2 per-
cent on average—and best in states that pay legis-
lators next to nothing—about 7 percent on average.
Of course, 7 percent is still far lower than the share
of working-class people in the general public, which
stands at around 52 percent. (Salaries clearly aren’t the
only factors keeping working-class Americans out of
office.) In terms of the hypotheses in question, how-
ever, the findings reported in Figure 1 offered no sup-
port for the idea that working-class citizens hold office
in larger numbers when state legislative salaries are
relatively higher (in which case we would expect a pos-
itive association in Figure 1) or when salaries exceed
some economic threshold (in which case we would ex-
pect a spike somewhere). To the contrary, these data
on state legislatures are squarely in line with the argu-
ment that paying politicians moremakes holding office
more attractive to professionals, not more attainable
for workers.5
Of course, states that offer higher and lower salaries
to legislators might also differ in other ways. States that
pay more tend to have more professionalized legisla-
tures, larger populations, and more big cities. They also
tend to elect more liberal members.6 Even when we
5 Excluding the visible outlier in Figure 1 (Maine 1979) from the
analysis did not alter these or any subsequent results.
6 To see if better-paid legislators are more conservative on average,
we calculated the average ideal point among lawmakers in each state
in 2007 using data from Shor and McCarty (2011). Higher salaries
were weakly correlated with more liberal state legislatures (r =
0.373), consistent with Fiorina’s (1994) finding that more Democrats
are elected in states that pay higher salaries.
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TABLE 1. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.41∗ − 0.57∗
(0.14) (0.16)
Session Length (in days) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff Size (in individuals) − 0.15∗ − 0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Political context
South (indicator) 0.78
(0.72)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.14∗
(0.04)
Term limits (indicator) 0.33
(0.87)
Income inequality − 0.21
(% of income to top 1%) (0.12)
Percent Black (percentage) − 0.08∗
(0.03)
Percent urban (percentage) − 0.03
(0.02)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.05
(0.08)
GOP vote share (percentage 0.00
of two-party vote) (0.02)
Income (avg. per capita − 0.03
personal income) (0.05)
Intercept 6.57∗ 8.76∗
(0.57) (2.85)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 200 200
R2 0.23 0.37
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working-class in
each state in 1979, 1993, 1995, and 2007 to the variables listed
here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
took these kinds of differences into account, however,
we still observed the same basic relationship evident
in Figure 1. Table 1 below reports the results of two
least squares regression models. In both, we regressed
the percentage of legislators from the working class in
each state in the pooled aggregate-level dataset (n =
200; 50 states × 4 years) on the official salary paid to
state lawmakers (again, adjusted to 2007 dollars). In
the first model, we also added fixed effects for each
year (models that use state and year random effects
with bootstrapped standard errors produced similar
results; see Appendix Table A2). We also controlled
for two additional measures of how professionalized
the state legislature was. Scholars who study legisla-
tive professionalism typicallymeasure the conceptwith
data on legislative salaries, the number of staff mem-
bers employed by the average state legislator, and the
average length of a legislative session in that state.7 To
7 Specifically, Staff Size is the average number of full-time, perma-
nent staff employed by the legislature, divided by the number of
account for the possibility that states that pay legis-
lators more also demand more from them—and that
these demands, not the salary itself—drive down the
representation of the working class, we added controls
for staff size and session length to the first model in
Table 1.
Viewed this way, our results were essentially the
same. According to the first model in Table 1, states
that paid legislators $75,000 tended to have about three
percentage points fewer working-class state legislators
than states that paid next to nothing. Of course, legisla-
tive compensation and other measures of profession-
alization go hand in hand—the correlation between
legislative salaries and session length was 0.56, the cor-
relationbetween salaries and staff sizewas 0.65, and the
correlation between session length and staff size was
0.38. Even with these controls in the model, however,
we still observed a significant negative association be-
tween salaries and working-class representation. This
isn’t to say that the smaller and nonsignificant coef-
ficients on staff size and session length are evidence
that these aspects of professionalism are unimportant,
of course; to the contrary, the point estimates for staff
size and session length may well be attenuated due to
the strong correlation between the three professional-
ization variables. Model 1 does not rule out the possi-
bility that staff size and session length affect working-
class representation; it simply illustrates that legisla-
tive salaries are not mere proxies for other aspects of
legislative professionalization, that is, that the associa-
tion between salaries and working-class officeholding
documented in Figure 1 is not simply being driven by
a lurking correlation between salaries and other as-
pects of professionalization. States that pay more have
fewer working-class politicians—and it doesn’t seem
to be simply because they have more professionalized
legislatures.
The same was true when we added additional con-
trols that captured other aspects of the political envi-
ronment. In the second model in Table 1, we added
four simple political context measures: (1) an indicator
for Southern states, (2) a measure of the unionization
rate (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003), which has been
found to predict working-class representation in state
legislatures, (3) an indicator for states that had term
limits for state legislators, and (4) the partisan makeup
of the state (the Republican percentage of the two-
party vote in the last presidential election). We also
controlled for three measures of the state economy:
(1) a measure of economic inequality (the percentage
of income earned by the top one percent of earners;
Frank 2009); (2) average per capita personal income
(from the Census Bureau and adjusted for inflation),
and (3) the poverty rate (from the Census Bureau).
And we added two additional demographic variables:
the percentage of state residents who were Black and
the percentage who lived in urban areas (from the
Census Bureau). If the salary paid to legislators in a
legislative seats in the body. Session Length is the number of legisla-
tive days that members meet in session in the year of observation.
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state was simply a proxy for some other feature of the
political landscape, adding these controls should have
dampened our results.
If anything, however, these controls sharpened our
original findings. Consistent with prior research (e.g.,
Carnes 2016; Sojourner 2013), we found a positive as-
sociation between unionization and the political rep-
resentation of the working class, perhaps reflecting the
role of unions in encouraging working-class people to
run or supporting their campaigns. We also found a
negative association between economic inequality and
working-class representation, perhaps suggesting that
in states where workers are more economically disad-
vantaged overall, they have a harder time running for
office or winning elections. And we did not find as-
sociations between working-class representation and
legislative session length or staff size (a finding that
seemed to support the idea that working-class repre-
sentation is not a response to the size of the reward or
burden associated with winning office).
Even with these controls in themodel, moreover, we
continued to observe a negative association between
state legislative salary and working-class representa-
tion (in fact, the association was slightly larger and
more precise in the second model in Table 1). The
same was true when we carried out a series of addi-
tional robustness checks (available on request), includ-
ing estimating the models for each of the four years
separately, using an alternative measure of legislative
salaries (Bowen and Greene 2014), and controlling for
the legal procedures each state used to raise legislative
pay. Although we did not have sufficiently fine-grained
data to estimate panel or time series models (since we
had only four years in our sample), we checked that
changes in legislative pay between our first and last
waves were not associated with changes in working-
class representation during that timeperiod (see Figure
A1 in the Appendix). They weren’t. We also estimated
models that analyzed not the salary offered to state
legislators, but the relative boost in salary a worker
might receive (by subtracting the average per capita in-
come in each state from the salary paid to state legisla-
tors; see Table A3 in the Appendix). And although the
data in Figure 1 did not appear to exhibit a quadratic
relationship, we tested a quadratic model and found
no evidence of a curvilinear relationship—it did not
seem to be the case that increasing legislative salaries
from $0 at first makes holding office feasible for lower-
income and working-class people (see Table A4 in the
Appendix). We also estimated models that controlled
for the distance to the state capital (following Silber-
mann 2015; see Table A5), the partisan composition of
the legislature (see Table A6), the sophistication of the
state party organizations (see Table A7), the competi-
tiveness of the two parties in the state (see Table A8),
the size of the state budget (see Table A9), and the cost
of campaigns in each state (see Table A10). Regardless
of howwe analyzed the data, we consistently found that
states that offer higher salaries to their legislators have
fewer working-class politicians, not more.
Who is taking their place? The answer seems to be
career politicians. InFigure 2,weuse the aggregate data
from Figure 1 to plot the occupational makeup of state
legislatures against legislative salaries, this time focus-
ing on several other occupational categories in the data:
lawyers, business owners, service professionals (like
teachers and social workers), and career politicians.
Most occupationswere either about as common in state
legislatures that paid more (like law), or less common
(like business and service professions). The striking
exception across all of the occupational categories in
the dataset was career politicians, legislators who were
classified as working primarily in politics (and not any
other outside job). In states that pay state legislators
more, state legislators aremore likely to be people who
work exclusively in politics. Paying politicians more
doesn’t seem to make holding office more accessible
to the working class—it seems to make holding office
more of a career.
Of course, it’s possible that in states that pay higher
salaries, working-class citizens are more likely to run
for office,win, but theneventuallybecome career politi-
cians. Does offering more compensation to politicians
encourage more lower-income and working-class peo-
ple to run, then start them on the path towards long
careers in office?
WHO RUNS, WHO WINS, AND WHO RUNS
AGAIN
More fine-grained individual-level data on state leg-
islative candidates in 2012 suggests that the answer is
no. The 2012 Broockman et al. National Candidate
Study asked respondents a highly detailed question
about their occupational backgrounds: “What is your
primary occupation? (If holding a political office is cur-
rently your primary occupation, what was your primary
occupation before you got into politics?)” With this
information, we can see whether politicians from the
working class—even thosewho have given upworking-
class jobs in favor of careers in politics—aremore likely
to hold office in states that pay higher salaries.
The National Candidate Study also included items
that asked whether each candidate was an incumbent,
items that asked whether each candidate had ever held
any other elected office, and data on whether each
candidate ultimately won the 2012 election. With this
information, we were able to ask whether working-
class Americans are more likely to run in states that
pay more, win in state that pay more, and run again.
They were not. Figure 3 plots the percentage of state
legislative candidates in each state from the working
class (panel (a)), the percentage of state legislativewin-
ners from the working class (panel (b)), the percentage
of incumbent state legislators from the working-class
(panel (c)), and the percentage of candidates who had
held any prior office who were from the working class
(panel (d)). The salary offered by the state legislature
appeared to have no bearing on the share of working-
class people in the candidate pool, the pool of win-
ners, or the pool of incumbent or experienced candi-
dates. (We reached the same conclusion when we esti-
mated regression models—available on request—with
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FIGURE 2. Legislative Salaries and the Occupational Makeup of State Legislatures (1979, 1993,
1995, and 2007)
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Conference of State Legislatures (1993, 1995, 2007), and authors’ data
collection.
controls for other aspects of the political environment.)
In states that pay politicians more, working-class peo-
ple (even those who have gone on to make a career
out of politics) don’t appear to be more likely to run,
to win, or to run again.
HOW CANDIDATES THINK ABOUT
SALARIES
In our aggregate-level data, states that pay more have
fewer blue-collar workers in their legislatures. In our
individual-level data, states that pay more have about
as many blue-collar candidates. Our individual-level
estimates are noisier, of course. (Our aggregate-level
data are based on information about every legislator in
every state, whereas when we average our individual-
level data, we only have information about 19 per-
cent of state legislative candidates.) Regardless, both
datasets cast doubt on the idea that paying politicians
more would encourage more working-class Ameri-
cans to hold office. At best, paying more isn’t as-
sociated with any change in economic diversity. At
worst, it’s associated with decreases in working-class
representation.
What might be going on in the minds of potential
candidates?Does raising salaries really affect how peo-
ple think about holding office? Reformers who sup-
port higher pay for politicians often argue that raising
salaries would make holding office more affordable for
working-class Americans. Research under the heading
of candidate quality, on the other hand, has long main-
tained that paying politicians more will make politi-
cal service more attractive to highly paid profession-
als (Besley 2004; Besley and Coate 1997; Caselli and
Morelli 2004; Osborne and Slivinski 1996).
With the National Candidate Study, it is possible
to directly examine one of the potential mechanisms
that might link salaries and candidate entry (and the
one most often discussed by reformers), namely, the
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FIGURE 3. When Legislatures Pay More, Do Workers Run, Win, or Run Again?
Source: 2012 National Candidate Study (Broockman et al. 2012).
financial opportunity cost associated with holding of-
fice. The survey included an item that asked respon-
dents, “Manypeoplewho think about running for office
choose not to because of the many personal challenges
entailed in seeking public service. When you first ran
for elected political office, did you feel seriously con-
cerned about any of the following?” One option was
“Losing out on income while serving in office.” An-
other was “Losing the job I had at the time [I first
decided to run].”
Figure 4 plots the percentages of working-class (left
two panels) and white-collar (right two panels) respon-
dents in each state who reported that they worried
about losing income and losing their jobs the first time
they ran for office. In states that paid more, working-
class candidates reported similar levels of anxiety about
losing their jobs and incomes. White-collar candidates,
however, reported significantly lower levels of anxiety
about losing their incomes and slightly higher levels
of concern about losing their jobs. Consistent with
the idea that paying more can offset the opportunity
cost of holding office for highly paid professionals,
in states that compensate politicians more generously,
white-collar professionals are less worried about losing
their incomes. (Again, we reached the same conclu-
sion when we estimated regression models—available
on request—with controls for other aspects of the po-
litical environment.) Professionals seem to recognize
that running for office may mean giving up their day
jobs, but they seem significantly less worried about lost
income in states that pay more.
Of course, we should be cautious in interpreting
these results: lost income is just one of the mecha-
nisms that might link legislative pay and reductions
in working-class representation (we cannot test the
prestige mechanism, the recruitment mechanism, or
the crowding-out mechanism with these data, unfor-
tunately). Moreover, another important caveat about
these results is that NCS respondents had already de-
cided to run for office. As a result, we don’t have re-
sponses from people who were seriously considering
running for office but who ultimately did not choose
to enter the race. However, these data give us a pic-
ture of the types of concerns that candidates face when
making the decision to throw their hats in the ring.
Like our analyses of who runs and wins in states that
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FIGURE 4. When Politics Pays More, Do Workers and Professionals Worry Less About Money?
Source: 2012 National Candidate Study (Broockman et al. 2012).
pay more, our analysis of the concerns candidates ex-
pressed suggested that paying politicians more doesn’t
do much to reduce the barriers to seeking office for
workers—and may make running more attractive to
professionals.
SHOULD POLITICIANS GET A PAY RAISE?
In a recent story on a proposed salary hike for Arizona
legislators, Blumberg (2014, 1) reports an interview
with Morgan Cullen, a policy analyst for the National
Conference of State Legislatures:
In states with low salaries, like Arizona, Cullen says many
lawmakers are retirees or independently wealthy business
owners who can afford to run. “You want those indepen-
dently wealthy people, you want the retirees, but you also
want people in their income-earning years as well so that
you are representing the population as a whole.”
Reformers often argue that the low salaries paid in
many of our political institutions ensure that only the
wealthy can afford to run for office and that offer-
ing higher salaries would attract more middle- and
working-class Americans.
Our analyses suggest that this line of reasoning
doesn’t hold much water. Data on the makeup of
state legislatures in the late-1970s, the mid-1990s, and
the late-2000s suggest that in states that offer leaders
higher salaries, working-class politicians are actually
crowdedout by career political professionals. Likewise,
surveys of the candidates who ran for state legisla-
ture in 2012 suggest that politicians from the work-
ing class—even those who identify as political profes-
sionals today—are no more likely to run, win, or run
again in states that pay more. And blue-collar candi-
dates aren’t less likely to worry about their incomes in
well-paying state legislatures. To the contrary, higher
salaries don’t seem to make political office more at-
tractive to workers; they seem to make it more attrac-
tive to professionals who already earn high salaries.
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According to our data, paying politicians more doesn’t
seem to promote economic diversity.
Of course, our study has several important limita-
tions that areworth reiterating.Weonly study one level
and branch of American political institutions, state leg-
islatures. We only examine the time periods for which
we have appropriate data. We are only able to test
one of the many mechanisms that might link politi-
cian compensation and working-class representation.
And although we do our best to control for poten-
tial confounding variables, our analyses are based on
observational data, with all the lurking problems that
entails. Going forward, the empirical burden of proof
would seem to be on those who maintain that paying
politicians more would increase the representation of
the working class—our study is the only one on this
topic, and it doesn’t find what reformers expect—but
a great deal more work could still be done on this
issue.
From the standpoint of research on politician
salaries, the most important limitation of this study
is that it only focuses on one political outcome—the
numerical representation of different social classes—
out of the many that might be linked to compensation
rates. Politicians’ salaries are associated with whether
they hold outside jobs, how productive they are in
our legislatures, how in-step they are with their con-
stituents, and whether they run for re-election. These
are all important features of our political process that
we have to consider and balance when answering ques-
tions about whether politicians should get a pay raise.
For scholars interested in politicians’ salaries, this study
provides a new piece of evidence about how salaries
matter, but obviously salaries matter in many other
ways.
A second important limitation from the standpoint
of research on politicians’ salaries is that this analy-
sis is limited to the United States. Much of the re-
cent research on officeholder compensation has been
conducted using cross-national data. It is important to
keep in mind that results from the United States states
may not generalize to other countries or regions (for
instance, the relationship between political compensa-
tion and working-class representationmay be different
in countries that haveworkers’ parties) and that follow-
up work using cross-national samples is still needed
before we can make generalizations about salaries
andworking-class representation outside of theUnited
States.
For scholars interested in why so few working-class
people hold political office in the United States, this
study seems to rule out another potential culprit.Work-
ers probably aren’t to blame for being unqualified, vot-
ers probably aren’t to blame for being biased against
workers—and governments probably aren’t to blame
for paying politicians too little. It also suggests that
resources may not be the only driver of class-based
differences in officeholding. It’s possible that working-
class people are less likely to run for office because
they simply have a harder time affording it, but it’s
also possible that they’re less likely to run because
they aren’t interested in holding office or because they
aren’t recruited. (This hunch is squarely in line with
the finding in Table 1 that more workers hold office
in states with higher unionization rates and with prior
research on unions and working-class representation.)
Resources could still matter, of course—for instance,
the loss of a salary while campaigning might be a far
bigger impediment for working-class people than the
salary offered while holding office. For scholars inter-
ested in explaining why the United States is run by
a white-collar government, this study’s findings sug-
gest that there is far more to the story than politi-
cians’ salaries—and maybe more than just resources
alone.
Last, for reformers, the lessonof this study is straight-
forward. Activists and political observers should stop
saying that raising legislative salarieswouldmake hold-
ing office more accessible for middle- and working-
class Americans or that it would reduce class-based
political inequalities. It probably wouldn’t.
APPENDIX: SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Table A1 notes:To check that the data in the 2012 National
Candidate Study were suitable for this analysis, we com-
pared data on the percentage of working-class candidates
among the candidates (third column) and winners (second
column) in the NCS to the percentage of officeholders from
the working class in the 2007 National Conference of State
Legislatures data (first column). Although the samples were
from different years, the percentage of workers in the 2007
NSCL dataset was positively correlated with the percentage
of workers who won office in the 2012 NCS (as we report
in bold at the bottom of the table), which suggests that the
FIGURE A1. Change in Legislative Salaries
and Working-Class Representation in State
Legislatures, 1979–2012
Notes: In this figure, the vertical axis plots the change in the
percentage of state legislators from the working class between
1979 and 2012, and the horizontal axis plots the change in
state legislative salary during the same time period. There is
no evidence that raising legislative salaries encourages more
working-class citizens to hold office.
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TABLE A1. Social Class Balance in the 2007
NCSL Dataset and the 2012 NCS Survey
% of % Workers % Workers
Workers Among Among
in Office Winners Candidates
NCSL NCS NCS
Sample 2007 2012 2012
AK 10.00 0.00 3.70
AL 1.40
AR 3.00 0.00 0.00
AZ 1.08 0.00 7.69
CA 0.00 0.00 2.63
CO 3.06 0.00 4.65
CT 1.10 0.00 4.65
DE 8.11 0.00 0.00
FL 4.39 0.00 0.00
GA 3.00 0.00 0.00
HI 1.31 0.00 3.03
IA 3.39 2.86 2.86
ID 1.96 0.00 0.00
IL 1.20 0.00 0.00
IN 4.70 0.00 2.50
KS 5.51 0.00 0.00
KY 4.40 0.00 0.00
LA 4.31
MA 0.50
MD 3.79
ME 5.91 3.33 6.67
MI 3.39 1.32 2.63
MN 2.50 0.00 4.00
MO 2.22 1.33 5.33
MS 4.71
MT 2.00 2.90 5.80
NC 1.67 0.00 0.00
ND 3.60 0.00 5.00
NE 4.10 0.00 0.00
NH 2.89 1.52 1.52
NJ 5.00 0.00
NM 4.45 3.23 3.23
NV 4.79 3.57 3.57
NY 0.00 0.00 0.00
OH 0.80 0.00 6.45
OK 1.43 5.88 5.88
OR 3.40 0.00 2.63
PA 0.40 0.00 0.00
RI 8.06 4.76 4.76
SC 1.18 0.00 0.00
SD 1.90 0.00 0.00
TN 1.50 0.00 0.00
TX 2.80 0.00 0.00
UT 2.90 0.00 5.66
VA 2.10
VT 5.10 2.94 4.41
WA 1.40 1.15 2.30
WI 0.80 1.64 8.20
WV 5.92 0.00 0.00
WY 3.30 0.00 0.00
Corr w
first col. 1.00 0.20 −0.03
survey elicited responses from a representative sample of
workers.
Importantly, however, the percentage of workers who held
office in 2007 was not correlated with the percentage of
working-class candidates in the National Candidate Study
(third column), which increases our confidence that the re-
sponse rate among workers was not endogenous to the out-
come of interest (i.e., that workers were not more likely to
respond to the survey in states where workers held office in
larger numbers).
Table A5 notes: We obtained replication data for Silber-
mann (2015). Because her unit of analysis is the state legisla-
tive district, we created a mean distance to capital variable
for each state.Moreover, because her study covers amore re-
cent time period than ours, we could only match her distance
to capital variable to one of our four years of observation
(2007). This left us with a sample of just 47; her dataset omits
Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska. When we added her distance
variable as a control inModel 1, we found that a higher mean
distance to the capital was associated with fewer workers in
office (although the difference was not statistically signifi-
cant) and that the relationship between salary and working-
class representation was still negative (although not statisti-
cally significant, perhaps owing to the smaller sample size).
When we added it as a control in Model 2, our results were
similar.
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TABLE A2. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation (with state
controls)
Model Model Model Model
1 2 3 4
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.41∗ − 0.57∗ − 0.39∗ − 0.45∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15)
Session length (in
days)
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in
individuals)
− 0.15∗ − 0.06 − 0.18∗ − 0.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Political context
South (indicator) 0.78 0.85
(0.72) (1.01)
Unionization rate 0.14∗ 0.13∗
(percentage) (0.04) (0.06)
Term limits
(indicator)
0.33 − 0.32
(0.87) (0.93)
Income inequality − 0.21 − 0.20
(% of income to
top 1%)
(0.12) (0.15)
Percent black
(percentage)
− 0.08∗ − 0.09∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Percent urban
(percentage)
− 0.03 − 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Poverty rate
(percentage)
− 0.05 − 0.00
(0.08) (0.07)
GOP vote share 0.00 0.04
(percentage (0.02) (0.04)
of two-party vote)
Income (avg. − 0.03 − 0.04
per capita (0.05) (0.04)
personal income)
Intercept 6.57∗ 8.76∗ 5.70∗ 5.96
(0.57) (2.85) (0.36) (4.45)
Year controls fixed fixed rand. rand.
effects effects eff. eff.
State controls none none rand. rand.
eff. eff.
N 200 200 200 200
R2 0.23 0.37 0.16 0.36
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working class in
each state in 1979, 1993, 1995, and 2007 to the variables listed
here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
TABLE A3. Relative Boost in Salary and
Working-Class Representation
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Legislative salary minus avg. − 0.40∗ − 0.57∗
per capita income (in $10,000s) (0.14) (0.16)
Session length (in days) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) − 0.16∗ − 0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Political context
South (indicator) 0.78
(0.72)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.14∗
(0.04)
Term limits (indicator) 0.33
(0.87)
GOP vote share (percentage 0.00
of two-party vote) (0.03)
Income inequality − 0.21
(% of income to top 1%) (0.12)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.05
(0.08)
Income (avg. per capita − 0.09
personal income) (0.06)
Percent black (percentage) − 0.08∗
(0.03)
Percent urban (percentage) − 0.02
(0.02)
Intercept 5.52∗ 8.95∗
(0.65) (3.13)
Year fixed effects yes yes
N 200 200
R2 0.23 0.37
Adj. R2 0.21 0.32
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working class in
each state in 1979, 1993, 1995, and 2007 to the variables listed
here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
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TABLE A4. Quadratic Model of Legislative
Salaries and Working-Class Representation
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.68∗ − 0.85∗
(0.29) (0.32)
Salary (in $10,000s) - squared 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Session length (in days) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) − 0.17∗ − 0.09
(0.07) (0.08)
Political context
South (indicator) 0.99
(0.75)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.15∗
(0.04)
Term limits (indicator) 0.26
(0.87)
GOP vote share (percentage 0.01
of two-party vote) (0.03)
Income inequality − 0.22
(% of income to top 1%) (0.12)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.06
(0.08)
Income (avg. per capita − 0.03
personal income) (0.05)
Percent black (percentage) − 0.08∗
(0.03)
Percent urban (percentage) − 0.02
(0.02)
Intercept 7.01∗ 9.08∗
(0.69) (3.13)
Year fixed effects yes yes
N 200 200
R2 0.24 0.37
Adj. R2 0.21 0.32
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working class in
each state in 1979, 1993, 1995, and 2007 to the variables listed
here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
TABLE A5. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation, Controlling for
Distance to the Capital
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.23 − 0.40
(0.17) (0.21)
Session length (in days) − 0.02∗ − 0.02∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) 0.10 − 0.01
(0.10) (0.14)
Political context
Distance to the capital − 0.34 − 0.18
(0.31) (0.43)
South (indicator) 0.97
(1.05)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.12
(0.09)
Term limits (indicator) 0.31
(0.66)
GOP vote share − 0.08
(percentage of two-party vote) (0.05)
Income inequality 0.03
(% of income to top 1%) (0.21)
Poverty rate (percentage) 0.09
(0.12)
Income (avg. per capita 0.04
personal income) (0.05)
Percent black (percentage) − 0.02
(0.05)
Percent urban (percentage) 0.02
(0.03)
Intercept 5.03∗ 3.69
(0.69) (4.91)
N 47 47
R2 0.27 0.43
Adj. R2 0.20 0.21
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2012), Sil-
bermann (2015), and authors’ data collection. Notes: Cells re-
port estimates from regression models relating the percentage
of state lawmakers from the working class in each state in 2007
to the variables listed here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
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TABLE A6. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation, Controlling for
the Partisan Makeup of the Legislature
Model Model Model Model
1 2 3 4
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.43∗ − 0.56∗ − 0.42∗ − 0.61∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16)
Session length (in
days)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in
individuals)
− 0.15∗ − 0.05 − 0.13∗ − 0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Political context
Democratic control
(indicator)
− 0.35 0.14 — —
(0.56) (0.57)
Republican control
(indicator)
− 0.53 − 0.62 — —
(0.61) (0.61)
Democrats in the — — − 2.09 − 1.71
legislature (1.23) (1.91)
(percentage)
South (indicator) 0.50 0.94
(0.75) (0.78)
Unionization rate
(percentage)
0.13∗ 0.14∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Term limits
(indicator)
0.39 0.32
(0.87) (0.89)
GOP vote share 0.02 − 0.00
(percentage of (0.03) (0.04)
two-party vote)
Income inequality (% − 0.20 − 0.26∗
of income to top (0.12) (0.13)
1%)
Poverty rate
(percentage)
− 0.07 − 0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Income (avg. per − 0.03 − 0.03
capita personal (0.05) (0.05)
income)
Percent black
(percentage)
− 0.08∗ − 0.08∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Percent urban − 0.03 − 0.02
(percentage) (0.02) (0.02)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Intercept 7.02∗ 8.56∗ 7.86∗ 10.50∗
(0.79) (3.18) (0.94) (3.50)
N 200 200 196 196
R2 0.23 0.38 0.25 0.39
Adj. R2 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.34
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working class in
each state to the variables listed here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
Observations from Nebraska, which has a nonpartisan legisla-
ture, are omitted for Models 3 and 4.
TABLE A7. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation, Controlling for
the Sophistication of State Party
Organizations
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.22 − 0.55∗
(0.18) (0.22)
Session length (in days) − 0.01 − 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) 0.08 0.05
(0.11) 0.14
Political context
Democratic sophistication 0.41 − 0.66
($ spent per citizen) (0.95) (1.03)
Republican sophistication − 0.71 1.39
($ spent per citizen) (1.62) (1.88)
South (indicator) 0.60
(1.21)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.22∗
(0.09)
Term limits (indicator) 0.42
(0.75)
GOP vote share 0.03
(percentage of two-party vote) (0.04)
Income inequality − 0.25
(% of income to top 1%) (0.19)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.05
(0.14)
Income (avg. per capita 0.05
personal income) (0.06)
Percent black (percentage) 0.02
(0.05)
Percent urban (percentage) 0.00
(0.03)
Intercept 4.54∗ 4.68
(0.62) (5.84)
N 50 50
R2 0.19 0.37
Adj. R2 0.10 0.12
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2012), Na-
tional Institute on Money in State Politics (2015), and authors’
data collection. Observations are from 2007 occupation data
matched with 2008 spending on state races by state party or-
ganizations. Earlier campaign spending data is not available
from NIMSP. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
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TABLE A8. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation, Controlling for
Party Competition
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.43∗ − 0.62∗
(0.14) (0.16)
Session length (in days) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) − 0.10 − 0.05
(0.07) (0.08)
Political context
Competition (% contests 0.04∗ − 0.02
won by <20%) (0.02) (0.02)
South (indicator) 0.70
(0.76)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.15∗
(0.05)
Term limits (indicator) 0.16
(0.93)
GOP vote share (percentage 0.03
of two-party vote) (0.05)
Income inequality − 0.26∗
(% of income to top 1%) (0.13)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.07
(0.09)
Income (avg. per capita − 0.02
personal income) (0.05)
Percent black (percentage) − 0.09∗
(0.04)
Percent urban (percentage) − 0.02
(0.02)
Year fixed effects yes yes
Intercept 5.25∗ 8.10∗
(0.80) (3.63)
N 186 186
R2 0.27 0.38
Adj. R2 0.24 0.32
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working class in
each state to the variables listed here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
Missing observations from Nebraska, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi are dropped from the analysis.
TABLE A9. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation, Controlling for
Budget Size
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.42∗ − 0.69∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Session length (in days) 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) − 0.07 0.05
(0.08) (0.09)
Political context
State budget size (in billions of $) − 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
South (indicator) 1.04
(0.75)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.18∗
(0.05)
Term limits (indicator) 0.42
(0.78)
GOP vote share − 0.00
(percentage of two-party vote) (0.03)
Income inequality − 0.17
(% of income to top 1%) (0.12)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.03
(0.07)
Income (avg. per capita − 0.05
personal income) (0.05)
Percent black (percentage) − 0.06
(0.03)
Percent urban (percentage) − 0.03
(0.07)
Year fixed effects yes yes
Intercept 6.81∗ 11.41∗
(0.56) (3.10)
N 150 150
R2 0.29 0.42
Adj. R2 0.26 0.35
Source: Insurance Institute of America (1979), National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (2012), and authors’ data collection.
Notes: Cells report estimates from regression models relating
the percentage of state lawmakers from the working class in
each state to the variables listed here. ∗p < 0.05, two tailed.
We use data from 1993, 1995, and 2007.
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TABLE A10. Legislative Salaries and
Working-Class Representation, Controlling for
Campaign Spending (2007 Only)
Model 1 Model 2
Professionalization
Salary (in $10,000s) − 0.26 − 0.49+
(0.18) (0.23)
Session length (in days) − 0.01 − 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Staff size (in individuals) 0.03 0.08
(0.11) (0.16)
Political context
Campaign spending 0.79∗ 0.62
($ per citizen) (0.30) (0.38)
South (indicator) 0.99
(1.41)
Unionization rate (percentage) 0.10
(0.09)
Term limits (indicator) 0.63
(0.80)
Income inequality (% of − 0.19
income to top 1%) (0.21)
GOP vote share (percentage − 0.00
of two-party vote) (0.05)
Poverty rate (percentage) − 0.14
(0.17)
Income (avg. per capita 0.04
personal income) (0.07)
Percent black (percentage) − 0.04
(0.07)
Percent urban (percentage) − 0.00
(0.03)
Year fixed effects n/a n/a
Intercept 3.15∗ 6.63∗
(0.78) (6.54)
N 44 44
R2 0.3123 0.4353
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2012), au-
thors’ data collection, and National Institute of Money in State
Politics (2015). Notes: Cells report estimates from regres-
sion models relating the percentage of state lawmakers from
the working class in each state to the variables listed here.
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, two tailed. We were only able to obtain
campaign spending data for 2006; as such, these models only
use data from 2007.
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